Concepts

Random thoughts on random topics

Martin Stokhof Wittgenstein Tags: , ,
North Sea

Essentialism and travelling concepts (continued)

A question that arises then is: what determines what are possible travelling concepts? One observation concerns the role played by `facts of nature’. These provide limits, by do not force a particular set of concepts on us, they determine a space of possibilities, different sets of concepts that we can employ practically. Now what is interesting to note is that, on the one hand, these limits set by nature are a given: reality (nature) is what it is, but that, on the other hand, we can imagine them to be different (think: science fiction) but not in a completely unlimited way. So there is a complex dynamics between what is the case and what we can think differently, and that is a dynamics that itself changes also.

That might suggest a very open space of speculative possibilities and possibilities to speculate, but as far as Wittgenstein is concerned there is third factor that plays a key role and that limits what makes sense to do with and in that space. It is the matter of `having a point’. A language game or practice needs to have practical value, and that applies both to the ones that we have as well as to the ones we can imagine. Now practical value itself is a very diverse concept. However, it does restrict what makes senses to do in this space of imaginative possibilities. Pure imaginability is not enough: any practice, be it factual or imaginable, need to have practical value, practical meaning for us to be a practice to begin with.

That might suggest a very open space of speculative possibilities and possibilities to speculate, but as far as Wittgenstein is concerned there is third factor that plays a key role and that limits what makes sense to do with and in that space. It is the matter of `having a point’. A language game or practice needs to have practical value, and that applies both to the ones that we have as well as to the ones we can imagine. Now practical value itself is a very diverse concept. However, it does restrict what makes senses to do in this space of imaginative possibilities. Pure imaginability is not enough: any practice, be it factual or imaginable, need to have practical value, practical meaning for us to be a practice to begin with.

To what extent Wittgenstein’s position here manages to avoid essentialism is I guess a moot point. It seems that Wittgenstein would consider that not a very interesting question, and that he is much more interested in how the space of possible practices is constituted and how it can change. The observation that such a plurality of such spaces exists, and that each of them changes over time, is what ultimately supports Wittgenstein’s anti-essentialism.

Martin Stokhof
from: Aantekeningen/Notes
date: 20/07/2023

Rambling thoughts on random topics

Martin Stokhof Various Tags: , ,

Pinggu

Contextual identity

Concerning contextualism and the question of human nature. It seems correct to say that speculation about the essence of human nature or the human species is limited by the contextual nature of the concepts involved: they are, fundamentally, concepts that we use to think about the world and about ourselves. So, it seems, it does not make much sense to ask whether these concepts still apply when we have evolved into something altogether different.

However, it would seem that even the latter conclusion might be too rash. It deals with a particular, and easy, situation: here are we, being what we are, and there are ‘they’, being altogether different. In such a situation, it seems indeed correct to say that the usual concepts no longer apply. But what about situations that are not so drastically different, but that represent more gradual differences? Thinking back: there must have been stages in our evolutionary history when language, thought, reason were somewhat different from what they are now. When did language become language-in-our-sense? That seems to be the wrong question to ask, it seems, at least if we think of it as a factual question that could be answered unequivocally. Think ahead: if we contemplate scenarios about cyborgs, brains implanted in machines, etc, then there, too, we are confronted with situations that defy a definite (positive or negative) answer to the question whether there is still a human nature, thinking, language.

So, it seems that not just the concepts, but also the very questions are contextual. This also indicates what is wrong with such considerations as Humboldt’s, who claims that we cannot consider the origin of language as a gradual process, since language constitutes reason and hence must be there as such, not piecemeal. That is a way of looking at it that has what little plausibility it has solely because it looks at the situation from the present perspective. But the point is that the fact that from the present perspective another perspective does not make sense, since it cannot be conceived in present terms, says nothing whatsoever about the other situation.

Martin Stokhof
from: Aantekening/Notes
date: 11/04/2005