On Marcuse’s criticism or linguistic philosophy

Description of ordinary use is one thing, analysis of it another. There is no reason to think that analysis of ordinary use cannot reveal, e.g., power structures that shape it. It is true that Wittgenstein’s own analyses are not focused on that, but the point that Marcuse wants to make is that it is impossible to do so. Moreover, we need to realise that, say, analysing power structures inherent in ordinary speech and critiquing those power structures are really two different concerns, and one might well be of the opinion that where philosophy has some specific expertise with regard to the first, it lacks the necessary authority for the second.

I would think that Cavell provides a good example of a ‘linguistic philosophy’ that not only describes, but also analyses and critiques, but refrains from issuing normative judgments. Isn’t it rather the lack of this third component, and not the second, that distinguishes what Marcuse wants to do? If that is correct, then he is right that linguistic philosophy doesn’t do what he wants philosophy to do, but not for the reasons that the gives, viz., its claimed ‘lack of analysis’.

Martin Stokhof
from: Aantekeningen/Notes
date: 19/04/2022