#### Logic and why it works

Proposition logic done in the usual manner with truth tables and Wittgenstein’s account in the *Tractatus* result in the same logic. So, why appeal to more than just truth tables? One answer is provided by Wittgenstein’s insistence (in 4.441) that *T(rue)* and *F(**als**e) *are not objects. That makes the usual way of stating the semantics or propositional logic an *abstraction*, i.e., something that itself requires philosophical explanation (foundation). Wittgenstein’s ‘situation semantics’ (association intended) in the *Tractatus* is exactly such an explanation (foundation), though not the only one possible. And therein resides its added value: it is not the logic per se, but the attempt to *explain* how it is possible, what it means, to do logic in this way, i.e., with *T*‘s and *F*‘s and truth tables. So, the *Tractatus* is best viewed as an answer (one answer, not the only one) to the question that is not asked often enough: ‘What is it that we are doing here? What makes it possible to define this logic in this particular way?’ And that means that the so-called ‘superfluousness’ of the Tractarian situation-ontology, and of the picture theory that is connected with it, is a *formal* superfluousness, one that goes only for the logic as a formal, abstract system, and which can be acknowledged only because we do not ask the pertinent *philosophical* question.

*Martin Stokhoffrom: Aantekeningen/Notesdate: 12/10/1990*

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